RECENT CASES.
OF DEFECTIVE Tin.E-A"
promissory note, obtained from the maker by duress was signed by the surety
without notice of the duress. Held: The surety could avail himself of the
BILLS AND

NoTEs-DURES--SuRETY-XOTICE

plea of duress against his principal. Bitner v. Diehl, 61 Pa. Super. Ct.
483 (190).
The general rule is that duress is a personal defense which can be set
up only by the person subjected to the duress. Robinson v. Gould, ii Cush.
55 (Mass. 1853); Hazard v. Griswold, 21 Fed. 178 (1884). An exception is
recognized when a surety gives his bond to secure the release of his principal from illegal arrest or imprisonment. Patterson v. Gibson, 8, Ga. 802
(1888); Schuster v. Arena, 83 N. J. L. 79 (1912). An exception is also
made where the principal and surety are in close relationship. Osborn v.
Robbins, 36 N. Y. 365 (1867); Schultz v. Catlin, 78 Wis. 61n (1891). It is
also a general rule that whatever discharges the acceptor of a bill or the
maker of a note, also discharges the drawer and indorser who are sureties.
Gunnis v. Weigley, 114 Pa. 191 (1886). So where the surety has no knowledge of the duress practiced upon his principal he will be discharged.'
Graham v. Marks, 98 Ga. 67 (1895) ; Griffith v. Sitgreaves, go Pa. 161 (1879);
Fountain v. Bigham, 235 Pa. 35 (1912). But a voluntary Indorser of a
negotiable instrument is not relieved from liability because it was given by
the maker to escape prosecution. Bowman v. Hiller, 130 Mass. z53 (188);
East Stroudsburg Nat. Bank v. Seiple, 13 D. R. 575 (Pa. 1904). And the
defense of duress does not avail the surety when the instrument is in the
hands of a holder in due course. Clark v..Pease, 41 N. H. 414 (186o).
CIVIL PR0CFDURE-REPLEViN-DEMAND---A vendee of certain goods, under
a conditional bill of sale, abandoned them upon the premises of her landlord,
who attached and held possession of the goods on account of unpaid rent.
Held: A demand for the possession of the goods was necessary before the
vendor could maintain an action of replevin. Crown Co. v. Reilly, 96 AtL
481 (N. J. 19x6).
The doctrine, at common law, was that replevin could be maintained
only ihen the goods and chattels were so taken that an action of trespass
de bonis asportatis would lie. A mere unlawful detention, without an
original wrongful taking, was not sufficient. Bruen v. Ogden, x N. J. L
370 (1830); Herdic'v. Young, 55 Pa. St. 1x76 (1867). By statute, in practically all of the states the action is also given for an unlawful- detention,
although the original taking was unlawful. Whitman y. Merrill, x25 Mass.
x2 (1878); Gildas v. Crosby, 61 Mich. 413 (1886).
But replevin will not
lie in all cases where goods are in another's possession. There must be,
in addiion, an actual conversion, or a refusal to deliver on demand. Newman v. Jenne, 47 Me. 52o (,86o) ; Veader v. Veader, 87 N. J. L 140 (1915).
Accordingly, replevin cannot be maintained by the mortgagee of personal
propert,, against the mortgagor, after default or condition broken, without
demand for possession first made. Black v. Pidgeon, 7o N. 3. L 8D2 (19o4).
(846)
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The general rule is that if the possession was rightfully acquired, a- demand
is ordinarily necessary to make the subscquent detention wrongful; and
replevin will not lie against one who has obtained possession of property
lawfully, until a proper demand is made for the same, and possession refused.
Ohio, cc. Rwy. Co. v. Noe, 77 Il. 513 (1875); Goodwin v.
'Wertheimer, 99 N. Y. x49 (1885).
CONTRACTS-COVENANT TO PAY T.XEs-FEDERAL INCO.MF TAx-Tn a railroad lease the lessee covenanted to pay all taxes, charges and assessments,
which should be assessed or imposed on the demised premises, the business
there carried on, the gross or net receipts derived therefrom, the capital
stock or the dividends thereon, or upon the franchises of the lessor.. Held:
The lessee is not required to pay the Federal Income Tax on the rental
in relief of the lessor. Little Schuylkill Co. v. Phila. & Reading Ry. Co.,
25 D. R. 132 (Pa. 1916).
Before the Sixteenth Amendment, Federal income tax laws were held
unconstitutional on the ground that an unapportioned tax on income derived from property was in substance equivalent to a direct unapportioned
tax on the property itself. Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., i58
U. S. 6ot (1895). But a tax on incomes is not a tax on property as such,
and this amendment merely provides that income taxes do not have to be
apportioned from whatever source derived. Black on Income Taxes (2nd
Ed.), Chap. IV, Sec. 187, et scq.; Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 24o
U. S. I (1916). In the principal case the income tax was considered a tax
on the net income from rent, but whether it is so considered or technically
viewed as a tax on rent is immaterial, where the agreement is in substance
and in appropriate terms to pay the income tax, and in such a case the
lessee is required to pay it. North Penn. R. R. Co. v. Phila. & Reading
Ry. Co., 249 Pa. 326 (i915).
As a rule of construction of leases the lessee
is only obligated to pay those taxes which he has expressly assumed to pay,
irrespective of what the grantor's intent may have been. Robinson v.
Allegheny County, 7 Pa. 161 (1&47).
CONTRACTs-RESTRAINT OF TRADE-AGREEMENT TO ABSTAIN FROM BusiNEss-The owner of a blacksmith shop in the country, sold it with a contract that he would not engage in the business in that neighborhood. Held:
The contract was valid and enforceable by injunction. Boggs v.'Friend,
87 N. W. 873 (IV. Va. x916).
All contracts, for the restraint of trade, are not to be deemed unlawful,
if merely incidental to the sale and transfer of a business, and for the
reasonable protection of the purchaser thereof. Generally, the test applied
is the reasonableness of the restraint imposed by the terms of the contract.
Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, io6 N. Y. 473 (1887); Herreshoff v.
Boutineau, 17 R. I. 3 (189o).
In passing upon the validity of such contracts, public interests, as well as those of the immediate parties, must be
consulted and protected; and contracts calculated to cause one to become
a public charge, or to deprive the public of valuable benefits, will not be
enforced. Oregon St. Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 2o Vall. 64 (U. S.
1873); Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U. S. 396 (i888). Where such
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a contract is not definitely limited in time and space, the modern tendency
is to construe it as intending only such sufficient time and such reasonable
space as may be necessary to protect the purchaser in the business purchased. Anchor Electric Co. v. Hawkes, 171 Mass. ioi (1898); Hubbard
v. Miller, 27 Mich. 15 (1873). Generally where the time is not specifically
limited by the terms of the contract, the implication is that the agreement
is to be operative during the seller's life, if necessary to protect the purchaser. Saddlery Mfg. Co. v. Hillsborough Mills, 68 N. H. 216 (i894);
Kramer v. Old, 119 N. C. z (x896).
ro REMARRY-A wife, who had secured
DIVORCE-CoLLUSIoN-PaoMIsE
a divorce upon the faith of her husband's promise to remarry her, sought
to have the decree vacated on the ground of collusion. Held: The decree
of divorce could not be revoked. Henderson v. Henderson, x56 N. W. 245
(N. D. 1916).
The courts have the power to vacate a decree of divorce. Kerr v.
Kerr, 41 N. Y. 272 (1869), and by the great weight of authority will exercise it in case of fraud. Dunham v. Dunham. 162 IlL 58 (1896); Uecker
v. Thiedt, 137 Wis. 634 (i909). The fraud may be on the jurisdiction of
the- court, Corney v. Corney, 79 Ark. 289 (19o6); Kearns v. Kearns, 70
N. J. Eq. 483 (i9o5) ; or on the party securing the divorce. Brown v. Grove,
i6 Md. 84 (1888); Olmstead v. Olmstead, 41 Minn. 297 (i889). But the
power is exceptional and will not be exercised when the petitioner is guilty
of laches. Whittley v. Whittley, IIl N. Y. S. io78 (i9o8); Catts v. Catts,
35 Pa. Super. Ct. 293 (x9o8). Even then public policy may require the
decree to be opened. Richardson v. Richardson, 67 N. J. Eq. 437 (1904).
A decree is not likely to be set aside where one of the parties has remarried. Zeitlin v. Ziitlin, 202 Mass. 205 (ixog). But the fact of remarriage
does not prohibit the court from vacating a decree, Allen v. Maclellan, 12
Pa. 328 (I849); Horton v. Stegmyer, 175 Fed. 756 (ixgio); even though
children have resulted from the subsqquent union. Lake v. Lake, xo8 N.
Y. S. 964 (i9o8). See also Appeal of Fidelity Ins. Co., 93 Pa. 242 (i88o);
Taylor v. Taylor, 52 Pa. Super. Ct. 388 (I913). Generally a decree of
divorce will not be set aside when it has been procured by collusion.
Simons v. Simons, 47 Mich. 253 (i88); Miltimore v. Miltimore, 4o Pa. 1x
(i86i). Where a promise has been made to remarry the petitioner, as in
the principal case, the decree will not be vacated. Karren v. Karren, 25
Utah, 87 (19o2); Robinson v. Robinson, 77 Wash. 663 (i9o4).

The same

is true where the complainant has been negligent. Champion v. Woods, 79
Cal. 17 (1889); or.where consent has been given to the decree, Rindge v.
Rindge, 22 Ind. 31 (1864); Maher v. Trust Co., 95" Ill. App. 365 (19o1).
But the courts are by no means unanimous on the subject of collusion, and
many will vacate a decree collusively obtained. Danforth v. Danforth, ioS
IlL 6o3 (1883); Winder v. Winder, 86 Neb. 495- (igio). See also Nagle
v. Nagle, 43 Pa. Super. Ct. 44V (i9io).
EQUITY JUIsDIcTI N-INJUNCTIoN-EJoINiING

PROCEEDING AT LAW-

A contract, to which two persons were joint parties, was modified by one
of them without authority from the other. The former then sued upon
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the modified contract in his own name. fteld: Aq injunction could issue
restraining the party from prosecuting the suit. Wolcott v. National Sig.
naling Co., 228 Fed. 811 (1915).
In a prior action between the parties in the principal case, it was held
that as they were jointly interested in the original contract, any claim under
it must be made jointly by the two parties. National Signaling Co. v. Fessenden, 207 Fed. 915 (1W13). When there is such a unity of interest as
to require a joinder of all the parties interested in a personal action, a
release given by one is as effectual as a release given by all. Osborn v.
Martha's Vineyard R. R., 140 Mass. 549 (1886). Where two parties are
jointly interested in a contract, a judgment in favor of one would bar any
subsequent action by him upon the contract, and would therefore operate
to defeat all action thereon. Cowley v. Patch, i2o Mass. 137 (1876);
Spencer v. Dearth, 43 Vt. 98 (x871). The settlement of rights between
joint tenants or joint owners of property is a familiar subject-matter of
equity jurisdiction; and when two or mnore persons have a common interest
in a security, equity will not allow one to appropriate it exclusively to himself, or to impair its worth to the others. Jackson v. Ludeling, 21 WalL
6x6 (1874).
'EQUITY JURISSIcTIoN-NUIsANcE-USE OF PREMIsEs-KNOWLEGE OF
OWNE-A statute authorized an injunction to prevent the use of premises

for the keeping of a disorderly hbuse. The owner did not know that the
house, which was leased through an agent, was being used for the wrongful
purpose. Held: An injunction was properly issued against the owner.
Moore v. State, i81 S. W. 438 (Tex. x916).
At law, when the nuisance necessarily arises from the use of the
thing demised or because of the use for which it was demised, the landlord is liable. Grandy v. Jubber, 5 B. & S. 78 (Eng. 1864); Fish v. Dodge,
4 Den. 311 (N. Y. 1847). But when the nuisance results from the improper
use of the premises by the tenant, he alone is liable. Gilliland v. Chicago
& A. R. Co., ig Mo. App. 411 (i885); Miller v. N. Y., etc., R. R., 125
N. Y. ix8 (i89O). A bill in equity to restrain a nuisance lies only against
those who, at law, would be liable to respond in damages, 2 Wood on
Nuisance, 3d Ed., p. n64. If a landlord rents a building for the express purpose of having conducted therein a business which is a nuisance
per se, he is liable, and must be presumed to have intended the usual
results and concomitants. Cahn v. State, 51o Ala. 56 (1895); Givens v.
Van Huddiford, 4 Mo. App. 499 (1877). So, an injunction will lie against
an owner who knowingly rents premises used in the illegal sale of liquor,
Martin v. Blattner, 68 Iowa 286 (1886), oi to be used for purposes of
prostitution. Tedescki v. Berger, 43 So. 96o (Ala. i9o7) ; Marsan v. French,
61 Tex. 173 (x884). It has been held, in a proceeding to abate a disorderly
house, that the owner is charged with the knowledge of his agent in charge
of the property. State v. Stroup, x5s N. W. 9o (Minn. 1916).

EQUITY JURISDcTJoN-STRIKFs-PicKETNr--The laborers in a foundry
combined to strike for the purpose of unionizing the establishment. The
foundry was picketed and other employees peacefully persuaded not to
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work. Held: The strike was lawful and the picketing could not be enjoined. Shaughnessey v. Jordan, Iii N. E. 622 (Ind. x916).
The legality of strikes depends on the object sought t9 be obtained
and the means used. A strike for the purpose of compelling an employer
to advance wages or desist from reducing wages is not in itself illegal.
Willcut, etc., Co. v. Driscoll, 2oo Mass. iio (i9o8) ; Karges Furniture Co.
v. Amalgamated, etc., Union, 165 Ind. 421 (igo5). But a strike to get rid
of a foreman because some of the workmen have a dislike for him, is not
for a lawful.purpose. De Minico v. Craig, 207 Mass. 593 (1911) ; Bausbach
v. Reiff, 224 Pa. 559 (i914). However, if the purpose is the strengthening
of the union by compelling the discharge of non-union men, it has been held
not unlawful. Kemp v. Division No. 241, 255 Ill. 213 (i912): but see contra,
Folsom v. Lewis, 208 Mass. 336 (1911). In Erdman v. Mitchell, -2o7 Pa.
79 (io3), it was held that a combination to prevent an employer from
employing others by threats of a strike, .was an unlawful purpose.
The courts differ on the question of the legality or illegality of picketing
by the striking employees. All are agreed that picketing accompanied by
threats and intimidation, is unlawful, and will be enjoined. Kolley v.
Coercive measures will be restrained.
Robinson, 187 Fed. 415 (1911).
McCormick v. Local Unions 216, 32 Ohio C. C. 165 (19o8). A number
of courts have also held that even peaceful picketing should be restrained;
In re Langell, 178 Mich. 3o5 (1954); Pierce v. Stableman's Union, 156 Cal.
70 (igog); for a picket, in its very nature, tends to accomplish riots and
disturbances of the peace. Barnes v. Chicago Typo. Union, 232 IlL 424
(i9o8). But the majority of courts agree with the principal case that
peaceful picketing is permissible and lawful, as long as it is confined strictly
to peaceful persuasion and argument. Goldfield Mines Co. v. Goldfield
Miners' Union, 159 Fed. $oo (I9O8); Jones'v. Van Winkle Gin, etc., Co.,
131 Ga. 336 (i9o8); Bittner v. West Virginia, etc., Co., 214 Fed. 716 (1914).
EQUITY-PLEADINr--DIsMIssAL Op BiLL-After a general finding by the
master in favor of the defendant and after the filing of an appeal by the
complainant, the latter was allowed to dismiss his bill without prejudice.
Held: Such a discontinuance involved more than the incidental annoyance
of a second litigation and was" prejudicial to the defendant in that it deprived him of the findings in his favor which were prima facie correct;
the voluntary dismissal should not have been granted. Smith v. Carlisle.
228 Fed. 666 (i9i6).
It is a well-recognized doctrine of equity that the complainant may
voluntarily dismiss his bill, without prejudice, at ariy time before the final
decree, if there has been no cross-bill. Lowenstein v. Glidewell, Fed. Cas.
No. 8, 575 (U. S. 1878); City of Detroit v. Detroit Ry. Co, 55 Fed. S69
(U. S. 1893); Paltzer v. Johnston, ii4 Ill. App. 493 (z9o4). And if the
cross-bill is purely a matter of defense, the dismissal 's still allowed, and
carries with it the dismissal of the cross-bill. Story: Equity Pleading, Sec.
399, note; Pethtel v. McCullough, 49 W. Va. 52o (igoi). This right, however, is generally considered to be at the discretion of the court, according
to the rights of other parties. Chi. & Alton Ry. Co. v. Union Mill Co.,
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And so
8 (1902).
if there has been a finding, as in the principal case, entitling the defendant
to a final decree, or if he would be materially damaged by it, the courts
will generally refuse to grant a voluntary dismissal without prejudice.
109 U. S. 702 (t04); Ebner v. Zimmerly, i8 Fed.

Gilmore v. Bort, i34 Fed. 658 (19o5); State v. lHemingway, 69 Miss. 491
(1891) ; Saylor's Appeal, 39 Pa. 493 (1861). It appears, however, ir Illinois,

that the right of voluntary dismissal is absolute in the absence of a crossbill. Reilly v. Reilly, 28 N. E. 960 (11. x89t). See also on this point, i
Beach: Modern Equity Practice, p. 469 ff.
EVIDENc-Res

Gestae-A witness was awakened by deceased entering

the room, her throat badly cut. He was allowed to give in evidence
what the deceased then said, although there was an unknown lapse of time
between the res geslac and the declaration. State v. McLaughlin, 70 So. 92S
(La. iq96).
The rule of this case is that in deciding whether a declaration should
be received in evidence as part of the res gestae, the test is not whether it
was made contemporaneously with, or immediately before or after, the
receipt of the wound; but whether it is a spontaneous statement, caused by
a state of mind created by the wound, continuing until the time of the
declaration.
The strict and earlier view of this matter, still adhered to in
some jurisdictions admitted only those declarations made while the event
was taking place. Rex v. Bedingfield, 14 Cox C. C. 341 (Eng. z879);
McCarrick v. Kealy, 7o Conn. 642 (1898). The modem tendency is toward
a much more liberal view. Jack v. Mutual Association, 113 Fed. 49 (1902).
The principal case is in accord with the widely accepted rule which makes
spontaneity the test of admission. Each case, however, being largely determined on its own peculiar facts, there is a wide divergence in the application of this rule. 3 Wigmore: Evidence, Sees. 1747 and 1749 ff.;
Heckle v.So. Pac. Ry., 123 Cal. 441 (i899) ; Scheir v. Quirin, 77 App. Div.
624 (N. Y. 1902); Commonwealth v. Werntz, 161 Pa. 591 (1894). In some
jurisdictions the admission of such declarations is greatly widened in scope
by statute. Brooks v. Holden, 55 N. E. 8o2 (Mass. i9oo).
EVIDENcE-TESTIMOXY OF WiFE AGAINST HusDAND--A prisoner charged

with murder, pleaded self-defense, and claimed that he had found his wife
in a compromising situation with the deceased; that in the quarrel that
ensued the deceased had drawn a revolver, whereupon the defendant struck
him with a stove poker. The wife denied any improper relations with the
deceased. Held: The evidence was admissible under the Act of April iI,
1889 (P. L 42), section 2, providing that where in any criminal proceeding

the husband makes a defense which attacks his wife's character or conduct, she shall be a competent witness in rebuttal for the commonwealth.
Commonwealth v. Garanchoskie, 96 Atl. 513 (Pa. 1916).

At common law a wife could testify neither for nor against her husband
in any suit to which he was a party. Kischmar v. Scott, z66 .Mo. 214 (1901);
Miller v. Stebbins, 77 Vt. 183 (i9o5). Where, however, the husband's interest in the suit was merely collateral and indirect, and where the record
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could not be used against him in another action, the wife was a competent
witness. Phillips v. Poulter, 11I Ill. App. 330 (19o3). In a few anamolous
cases based on public policy, the wife was a competent witness though the
husband was directly interested. Cramer v. Hart, 154 Mo. 112 (1900);
Trometer v. Dis. Col., 24 App. D. C. 242 (14);
State v. Wiseman, i3o
N. C. 7--6 (1902). In most jurisdictions statutes now enable a husband orwife to testify in the other's behalf, cf. Act of April r5, j869, P. L. 3o
(Pa.); also Act of May 3, 1887, P. L. 158 (Pa.). Under such statutes, a
wife, once having taken th6 stand in behalf of her husband, may be compelled, on cross-examination, to give evidence against him. Ballentine v.
White, 77 Pa. 2o (1874).
Under the Act of 1889, supra, two novel questions arise: (i) Whether
the statute is applicable when the character or conduct of the wife ;s only
collaterally in issue, and is not directly raised by the accused. k-) WVhether
the act is to be extended to criminal proceedings of every kind or to be
limited to proceedings instituted by the wife against her husband. Both
questions are answered by the court in the principal case in the affirmative.
PROPERTY-GIFTS Inter Vizos-DF.UVERY-A piano in the home of the
defendant, was used exclusively by his step-daughter, under a claim of
ownership; and it appeared that the defendant intended it as a gift to her.
Held: There was a sufficient delivery. Allen Co. v. Edwards, x54 Pac. io66

(Cal. 1915).
. The sufficiency of the delivery, to constitute a valid gift, depends on
the character of the property and the situation of the parties, 2 Schouler:
Pers. Prop., Sec. 67; Phenix v. Gilfillan, 47 Il1. App. 220 (Ig92); Newman
v. Bost, 122 N. C. 542 (1898). As far as possible from the nature of the
property the delivery should be actual. McHugh v. O'Connor, 9r Ala. 243
(x89o). But there may be constructive delivery. Vosburg v. Mallory, 135
N. V. 577 (Ia. 1912); Marsh v. Fuller, 18 N. H. 26o (1846); Phipard v.
Phipard, 55 Hun 433 (N. Y. i8go). Between members of the family actual
delivery is often hard to prove; and so facts, showing an intention to give,
coupled with dominion by the alleged donee are generally regarded as sufficient to form a valid gift, as in the principal case. Ross v. Draper, 55 Vt.
404 (1883); Colby v. Portman, ii5 Mich. 95 (1897).
REMOVAL

OF

CAUSES-PROCEEDINGS

AFTER

REMOAL-IMMUNITIEs-A

non-resident was arrested in Philadelphia to answer before a coronor's jury,
by which he was discharged. As he was leaving the building -in which the
inquest was held. he was served with a summons in a civil case. The cause
was removed into a federal court. Held: He was immune from service of
process. Feister v. Hulick, 228 Fed. 821 (i96).
The removal of a cause from a state to a federal court is not a waiver
of the defense of irregularity in the service of process; but after the
removal, the defendant may raise any question which might have been
raised had the writ issued from the court to which the cause has been
removed. Wabash v. Brow, 164 U. S. 271 (z896).
In Pennsylvania, and
in many other jurisdictions, it is held that persons in custody under criminal charges are not immune from service of process, and that this immunity
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is confined to parties in civil proceedings, unless it appear that the arrest on
the criminal charge was a contrivance to get the defendant into custody in
the civil suit. White v. Underwood, 125 N. C. 25 (1899); Wood v. Boyle,
177 Pa. 620 (i896). This distinction is repudiated by the federal courts,
which hold that the immunity from service of process extends to all persons
under arrest, and whose attendance in court is therefore compulsory.
Druelle v. Allen, 193 Fed. 546 (1912); Stratton v. lIughes, 211 Fed. 557
(1914).
Res Adjudicata-JuGlsENr ON DFr.itURR-Tn an action on promissory
notes, it appeared that there had been a former suit between the same
parties and upon the same facts pleaded, in which a judgment had been
rendered sustaining a demurrer to the declaration. Held: The former
judgment was on the merits, and until reversed was a bar to the later
action. Duncan v. Deming Co., i54 Pac. 651 (Okla. 1916).
The principal case is in accord with the general rule that a judgment
or decree rendered on demurrer to a material pleading setting forth the
facts is as conclusive of the matters confessed by the demurrer as a verdict
finding the same facts would be, since the matters in controversy are established in the former case as well as in the latter by matter of record; and
facts thus established can never thereafter be contested between the same
parties or those in privity with them. Northern Pac. Rwy. Co. v. Slaght,
If judgment
205 U. S. 122 (1907) ; People v. Harrison, 253 I1. 625 (1912).
is rendered for the defendant on a demurrer to the plaintiff's pleading, the

plaintiff cannot thereafter maintain against the samb defendant or his
privies any similar or concurrent action for the same cause on the same
grounds.as were disclosed in the first declaration. Smith v. Smith, 125
Ga. 83 (i9o6); Old Dominion, etc., Co. v. Bigelow, -2o3 Mass. 159 (gog).
If, however, the plaintiff in the second suit allcge' additional facts, so that
the second declaration does not depend for its legal sufficiency on the same
question of law as in the first case, he is not prevented from prosecuting
a second time the same cause of action. Prall v. Prall, 58 Fla. 496 (1909),
and if the demurrer in the former case was based merely on formal and
technical defects, the judgment thereon is no bar to a suit on an amended
declaration correctly setting forth a good cause of action. Papworth v.
It is well settled, also, that where a deFitzgerald, siI Ga. 54 (goo).
murrer goes both to defects of form and also to the merits a judgment
thereon not designating between the two grounds will be presumed to rest
on a defect of form. Wotes v. Rwy. Co., ix Ariz. 39 (9o7).
Where final judgment is rendered overruling a demurrer which goes
to the sufficiency of the cause of action, the rule is the same as where the
demurrer is sustained. Alley v. Nott, III U. S. 472 (1884); Cameron v.
Hinton, 48 S. W. 24 (Tex. x88).
SALES--CNDITIONAL

SALE-RIGHT-

OF THIRD

PARTIEs-Electrical

ap-

paratus was appropriated to a construction contract, the vendor reserving
title thereto until payment. The vendee became insolvent and his receivers
took over the work, relying on his apparent ownership and thus standing
as execution creditors. The vendor sought to hold the-owner accountable
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to him by virtue of his reserved title. Held: The secret retention of title
is good only between the parties and not as against execution creditors of
the vendee. General Electric Co. v. Richardson, 228 Fed. 758 (U. S. i916).
The majority rule is that in the absence of fraud conditional sales are
valid as*well against third parties as against the parties to the transaction.

Harkness v. Russell, x18 U. S. 663 (1886). Such third person may be a
bona fide purchaser from the vendee, Coggill v. Hartford and N. 1H.R. Co.,
3 Gray (Mass.) 545 (1855); Ballard v. Burgett, 40 N. Y. 314 (1869), or
an execution creditor, Cole v. Berry, 42 N. J. L. 308 (tSo); Herring v.
Hoppock, 15 N. Y. 409 (1857). Only a few jurisdictions dissent from this
well-settled doctrine. Van Duzor v. Allen, go 11. 499 (1878) ; Hall v. Hinks,
21 Maryland 406 (1863); Forest v. Nelson Bros., 1o8 Pa. 481 (1888).
In the principal case the court followed the usual rule to apply the law
of the state from which the case is appealed. Since it was a Pennsylvania
contract the court embraced the minority view. It was early decided in
Pennsylvania that a separation of possession and title gives rise to a false
credit. Martin v. Mathiot, 14 S.& R. 214 (186), citing Clow v. Woods, 5
S. & R. 275 (1819). A distinction is made between a bailment and a conditional sale, Ott v. Sweatman, j66 Pa. 217 (1895), and it has been held
that the transfer of possession must be in pursuance of a sale to enable
the creditor to attach. Chamberlain v. Smith, 44 Pa. 431 (1863). The case
of Forest v. Nelson Bros., mipra, is held to have settled the law in Pennsylvania that whatever rights the vendor may reserve as between himself and
the conditional vendee, the goods in the hands of the latter are subject to
levy by his creditors. It has been held that the same principle applies to a
receiver where he obtains his authority from the court in the interest of'
creditors; and so deriving his authority by law, even knowledge of the sale
agreement is immaterial. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Clipper Publishing
213 Pa. 2o (i9o6).
Co., Statutes
have now been passed by a majority of the states requiring
the recording of conditional sales.
RIGHTS FoR ALIENATION OF WIFE'S AFPEcTroN By
mother wrongfully persuaded her married daughter to leave
her husband. Held: The husband could recover from the mother. Francis
TORTS-HuSBAND'S

PARENTS-A

v. Outlaw, 96 Ati. 517 (Md. 1916).

The right of a husband to maintain an action against anyone who has
wrongfully alienated the affections of his wife, and deprived him of his
eonjugal rights, is well established. Smith v. Lyke, 13 Hun 24 (N. Y.
1878) ; Gernerd v. Gernerd, i85 Pa. 233 (1898). In a suit, by a husband,
against the parents of his wife, for the alienation of her affections, it is
not enough to prove merely that the parents enticed her away from her
husband, and persuaded her not to live with him. Multer v. Knibbs, x93
Mass. 556 (x9o7). In addition to these facts, the husband must show that
the parents were actuated, in their conduct, by malice or ill will toward the
husband, and not by a proper parental regard for the welfare and happiness
of the child. Holtz v. Dick, 42 Ohio St. 23 (1884). In such an action,
the material question is the intent with which the parent acted,

RECENT CASES
rather than the wisdom, or even the justice, of the course which he took.
Rice v. Rice, zo4 Mich. 371 (1895) ; Hlutcheson v. Peck, 5 Johns. 196 (N. Y.
18o). A parent may advise a daughter to abandon her husband, if the
parent honestly believes that the continuance of the marriage relation will
tend to injure her health, or destroy her peace of mind; and in such case
the parent incurs no liability to the husband, though- it may develop that
the parent acted upon mistaken premises or false information. Oakman v.
The
Belden, 94 Mfe. 28o (19oo); Tucker v. Tucker, 74 Miss. 93 (1896).
burden is upon the husband to show that the parent was prompted by
malice in what was said and done, and to overcome the presumption that
the parent acted under the influence of natural .affection, and for what
he believed to be the real good of his child. Brown v. Brown, 124 N. C.
19 (18Dg).
Wiu.s-GiFrs Mortis Causa-TSTAMENTARY LANGUAGE-A wife immediately prior to an operation which resulted in her death, directed her
husband to make certain dispositions of her personal effects but made no
further effort to deliver the same. Held: Her language was at most of a
testamentary character and no gift causa mortis resulted. In re Liphart, 227
Fed. 135 (U. S. I915).
The rule is well settled that mere testamentary declarations upon the
part of the donor unaccompanied by delivery of the property will not
sustain a gift mortis causa. Miller v. Jeffress, 4 Grat. 472 (Va. 1848);
Basket v. Hassell, i7o U. S. 6o2 (1897). It has been frequently held that
three essentials must exist to effect such a gift: (t) It must be of personal
property, (2) The gift must be made in the last illness while under apprehension of death, and (3) there must be a complete delivery at the time.
Stokes v. Sprague, iio Iowa 89 (1899); Johnson v. Colley, 1o Va. 416
(iqo3). These requisites are generally contrasted with the rules governing a testamentary gift where impending apprehension of death and immediate delivery of the property are not essential. Emery v. Clough, 63
N. H. 552 (1885); Vosburg v. Mallory, 135 N. W. 577 (Iowa 1912).
It has been held that the infallible test in distinguishing a gift mortis
causa from a testamentary disposition is "delivery, change of dominion in
praesenti." Trenholm v. Morgan, 28 S. C. 268 (i887). This delivery may
be constructive or symbolical, as long as it is as perfect and complete as
the nature of property and the attendant circumstances will permit. People
v. Benson, 99 Il1. App. 325 (igoi) ; Waite v. Grubbe, 43 Oregon 4o6 09o3).
And so it may be to a third person for the donee. Johnson v. Coolley, supra.
But it seems that such third person may defeat the gift by his delay in
taking possession until after the donor's death, even -though the latter's
intention was unmistakable. Wilcox v. Matteson, 53 Wis. 23 (i88i).
WILLS-WITNESS-S-COM.PETENcY-A

will was attested by a stockholder

of a bank which was named as executor. Held: By statute the witness,
who was otherwise incompetent, was required to testify in support of the
will, but was barred from participating in the administration of the estate.
Scott v. Couch, in N. E. 272 (I1. x916).
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The competency of a witness is to be determihed from the facts as
they existed at the time of attestation, and not as they exist at the time
when the will is presented for probate. Miller v. Carothers, 6 S. & R. 215
(Pa. 182o); Estep v. Morris, 38 Md. 424 (z873).
Likewise in the case of
a nuncupative will. Haus v. Palmer, 21 Pa. -g6 (1853).
So if a codicil
gives a legacy to a witness of a will, he is not thereby rendered incompetent. Historical Soc. v. Kelker, 2-6 Pa. 16 (igog). A credible witness is
the same as a competent witness. Boyd v. McConnell, 2o9 Ill. 396 (19o4).
But competency is not to be confused with credibility. Klinzner's Will,
13o N. Y. S. 1o59 (.igi).
Generally a witness is competent who is not
for any legal reason disqualified from testifying in respect to the subject
matter under investigation. O'Brien v. Bonfield, 213 Ill. 428 (904) ; Combs's
Appeal, 1o5 Pa. 155 (1884); or who is not beneficially interested in the
will. Wiley v. Gordon, io4 N. E. Soo (Ind. 1914).
But by. statutes in
most states the beneficiary loses his interest, if the will cannot be otherwise
proved, and he is thus rendered competent. Swanzy v. Kolb, 94 Miss. 10
(i9o8) ; Williams v. Way, 135 Ga. io3 (1io). An executor is a competent
witness, Snyder v. Bull, 17 Pa. 54 (1851) ; Tierney's Estate, 1o3 Minn. 28
(19o8), even in a will making a bequest to charity in Pennsylvania.
Jordan's Estate, I6x Pa. 393 (1894). So the wife of the executor is competent. Lyon's Will, 96 Wis. 339 (I897). But the wife of the testator is
not competent. Pease v. Allis, xio Mass. 157 (x872); nor is the wife of a
devisee. Sullivan v. Sullivan; io6 Mass. 474 (i87x).
Contra, Lanning v.
Gay, 7o Kan. 353 (xo4). One who is named as attorney in the will is
competent. Rehard's Estate, 143 N. W. iio6 (Ia. 1913).
So one who is merely interested in a charitable organization or a member of a church may be competent. Will v. Sisters of St. Benedict, 67
Minn. 335 (1897) ; Conrades v. Heller, xig Aid. 448 (1912). And a salaried
employee of a corporation made a trustee for a charity is not incompetent.
Carson's Estate, 244 Pa. 4oi (1914). The Pennsylvania cases are not clear
as to what is a direct interest. Cf. Kessler's Estate, 22r Pa. 314 (19o8), and
Jeanes' Estate, 228 Pa. 537 (i91o).
The trustees of a charity were held
interested. Fetterhoff's Estate, 228 Pa. 535 (i9io). A member of the executive committee of the charity is not disinterested. Stinson's Estate, 232
Pa. 218 (1911). A charitable bequest was formerly defeated where one of
the witnesses was a legatee under the will. Kelly's Estate, 236 Pa. 54 (1912).
This has been changed by the Act of i91i, P. L 702. Leech's Estate, 236

Pa. 57

(1912),

semble.

